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**WESTERN RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SADCC**

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IN SOUTHERN AFRICA - THE CASE OF SADCC**

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ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACP	-	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (of the Lome Convention)
AED	-	Africa Economic Digest
CMI/DERAP	-	Chr. Michelsen Institute/Development Research and Action Programme
DAC	-	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
EEC	-	European Economic Community
EIU	-	Economic Intelligence Unit
FAO	-	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	-	Gross National Product
IFC	-	International Finance Corporation (of the World Bank)
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
NIPO	-	Nordic Import Promotion Offices
OECD	-	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
PTA	-	Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States
RMA	-	Rand Monetary Area
SADCC	-	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
SAR	-	South African Rand
SATCC	-	Southern African Transport and Communications Commission
SDR	-	Special Drawing Right (IMF currency designation)
SIAS	-	Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
UN	-	United Nations
UNIDO	-	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
MIMCORD	-	Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development
ZK	-	Zambian Kwacha

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CASE OF SADCC

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1. BACKGROUND

The Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was institutionalised in April 1980 and consists of nine member countries, namely, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It aims primarily at co-ordinating the regional members' development in such areas as industry, agriculture, transport, communications, energy, and other related fields. Support for political liberation in the entire region is among its general objectives.

Apart from the 1980 Declaration signed by the Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, SADCC has no treaty providing for binding rules and regulations. The SADCC Memorandum of Understanding, dated 20 July 1981, basically established the Organisation's main institutions but hardly amounts to a legal treaty with constitutionally-binding commitments. Consensus and voluntarism, rather than binding rules are, thus, the principal criteria used by member states to devise and operationalise SADCC decisions and programmes.

Mindful of the disparities in development levels among member countries and the need to contain polarisation effects that could result from maldistribution of economic rewards from integration, SADCC, under its policy of decentralisation of responsibility, used both the criteria of economic effectiveness and redistributational considerations in responsibility allocation.¹ The phenomenon of decentralisation of responsibility in SADCC is a clear departure from the tradition in most regional integration schemes in developing countries. While this arrangement has the advantage of avoiding the creation of a costly supranational institution, among its demerits is the danger of devising and developing programmes that are isolated from each other in the absence of an effective co-ordinating mechanism. This problem may lead to absence of inter- and intra-sectoral linkages

as well as duplication of activities that could result in excess capacity and, thus, wastage of the scarce sub-regional resources. Adequate and informed consultations between the co-ordination units is, therefore, a fundamental requirement in the SADCC arrangement to facilitate the harmonisation of regional policies and strategies.

In SADCC's present organisational framework, however, neither the small Secretariat in Botswana nor the Annual Summits of the Heads of State and Government is well equipped to dispense the crucial co-ordinating and consultative role. A cautious and pragmatic expansion of the SADCC Secretariat to provide for additional operational and functional capacity, though at the expense of bureaucratic enlargement, would, thus, be desirable in the long run. There is presently very little co-ordination in sectoral planning within the region. As UNIDO remarked in the case of the industrial sector, "the role of Tanzania is restricted mainly to project identification, largely through sub-sectoral studies. It does not cover harmonisation of industrial policies, legislation, incentives... and overall industrial promotion activities and machineries" (UNIDO, 1983, p.16).

2. SADCC PERFORMANCES AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

By world standards, the economies of SADCC countries are very weak and greatly conditioned by extra-regional politico-economic events. SADCC countries have experienced more adverse external economic shocks during the 1980s than before. For example, with the exception of Zambia which suffered severely from the post-1975 decline in world copper prices (mining, predominantly copper, accounts for over 90% of Zambia's total export earnings), the independent SADCC members achieved an average annual GDP growth of over 6% during the pre-1980 period. The post-1980 era tells a different story: per capita output (at constant prices) in seven SADCC countries has stagnated or declined over the 1980-84 period with the exception of Zimbabwe (for the 1980-81 period only) where the post-independence recovery resulted in increased output; and Botswana which was helped by increased world market access of its quality beef, expansion in diamond production and government services. (SADCC, 1985(a), p.4; SADCC, 1986(a), p.7).

During 1985, several developments brought a limited relief to the region's productive sectors:

- (a) the whole region, with the exception of Botswana, received adequate rain after a three-year drought period;
- (b) decline in global interest rates and value of the dollar; and
- (c) significant reduction in oil price.

However, despite such improvements which, for (a) above, resulted in increased regional agricultural output during the 1985/86 season, major structural weaknesses in the region's economies stifled recovery. These included:

- worsening terms of trade in which prices of most developing countries' raw materials remained depressed while those of Western economies' manufactured goods continued rising. This worsened the balance of payments position of all SADCC countries most of which now suffer from a critical shortage of foreign exchange needed to import essential machinery and inputs for their industrial sectors;
- reduced export sales due to recession and increasing protectionism in Western markets while intra-SADCC trade remained very insignificant, at between 4 - 5% of total regional trade;
- deterioration of existing infrastructure;
- underutilisation of installed industrial capacities due, inter alia, to market limitations and inadequate inputs because of lack of foreign exchange;
- declining per capita output which is 30% or lower than previous peak levels in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia;
- reduction in credit market access, foreign direct investment, and concessional financial flows; and
- mounting external debt which is accompanied by the ever-rising interest rates, resulting in further inability of most SADCC countries to meet their payment obligations, leading to debt reschedulling. Table I shows the Sub-Saharan Africa's public long-term debt and debt-service and clearly demonstrates the seriousness of the problem.

Apart from the above general externally-induced economic constraints, several country-specific problems contributed to the stagnation of the region's aggregate GDP during 1985. In Angola, the good oil price in 1985 led to appreciable economic recovery but the South African- and United States- backed UNITA rebel activities against the Angolan government affected positive growth. The low oil price since early 1986 has further worsened Angola's economic performance. In Botswana, the earlier-mentioned improvements in economic activity were affected by drought which reduced agricultural output significantly.

The fall in the South African Rand has had serious negative effects on the economies of Lesotho and Swaziland by virtue of their membership of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA). The South African currency fell to \$1 = SAR2.6 (commercial rate) in mid-August 1986 from \$1=SAR1.90 in January 1985. As a result, Lesotho's currency, Maloti, and the Swazi Lilangeni depreciated by 52% against the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR) during the 18 months before January 1986. As the value of the two countries' currencies collapsed with the Rand - to which they are pegged - their Rand reserves fell by as much as 50% within 24 months amidst inflated debt-service requirements (AED, 1986(a), p.18). In Lesotho, the early 1986 South African blockade and low rainfall depressed economic performance of that small country even further.

As for Malawi, despite better performance in its strategic agricultural sector during 1985, high transport costs caused by disrupted routes to the sea via Mozambique affected overall economic progress. In the case of Mozambique, the effects of the South African-supported MNR activities not only caused major disruptions in economic performance, despite improved rainfall, but also led to mounting tensions between that country and Malawi amidst the latter's alleged harbouring of anti-Mozambican rebels. In September 1986, late President Machel expressed his strong concern over alleged Malawian government involvement in the destabilization of his country.

In Zambia, despite a good agricultural season due to increased rainfall during the 1985/86 season (registering an all time record of 10.9 million bags of maize), economic performance remained unsatisfactory due, *inter alia*, to foreign exchange shortages and depressed copper prices. Although the newly-introduced auction system - announced, on 4 October 1985 - brought some relief to importers, it has resulted

in higher consumer prices while the country's ever increasing inflation has resulted in a depreciation in demand and consumption. Following the auctioning of foreign currency, the value of the Zambian Kwacha fell from around \$1 = ZK2.5 in October 1985 to its lowest level of \$1 = ZK15.25 within 14 months in December 1986.

The situation in Tanzania has not been different. Amidst depressed economic activity and donors' continued reluctance to provide more concessional aid unless and until Tanzania softened its position on the IMF conditionalities, the new Mwinyi government deviated substantially from the economic policies of former President Nyerere, if one is to go by the economic recovery programme that country presented to donors at the June 1986 consultative meeting in Paris (AED, 1986(b), pp.2-3; Addison, 1986, pp.81-3). It is only in Zimbabwe where an appreciable level of economic growth was registered in almost all the economic sectors during 1985, although foreign exchange shortfalls had inhibited further recovery. Thus, given the above-analysed poor economic performance in the region, SADCC has increasingly turned to the international community for assistance in its recovery programmes.

3. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SADCC

The success or failure of international support for SADCC must be understood within the context of the nine countries' joint requirements, priorities, and policies vis-a-vis the different donors' interpretation of these needs. This should be perceived in the context of the general aid flow to developing countries as a whole.

3.1 Aid Flow to Developing Countries

It is important to state at the outset that analysis of the effects of development aid is not free from controversy. Whereas, for instance, some studies have argued that positive effects have resulted from development aid injection in the economies of the now relatively advanced, middle-income countries, particularly those in Asia (Papanek, 1973; Dowling & Heimenz, 1983), some researchers have attempted to show that the effects of aid has generally been negative in the poorest countries, particularly in the raw material-dependent African states (Heimenz, 1986, p.177; Burki & Eyres, 1986).

Poor co-ordination among donors themselves has frustrated effective realisation of foreign assistance's anticipated benefits. "With too many donor agencies operating in a given sector or sub-sector," complains Robert Cassen, "project- and equipment-types proliferate..., a multiplicity of donors, the complexity of their separate procedures; and the procedural and data requirements of project implementation and monitoring can be intolerable burdens on the recipient's administration; [and] most important, the recipient's budgetary process may be inadequate to cope with the demands of multiple unco-ordinated aid activities for domestic resources to implement the external ones supplied by donors" (Cassen, 1986, p.11)². In terms of the volume of aid flow to developing countries in general, the amounts are quite significant although, as Table II shows, only the three Scandinavian countries, Netherlands and France have reached the UN-recommended target of 0.7% of the donors' GNP.

3.2 Aid Flow to SADCC

Despite some disappointment registered at the November 1980 Maputo 'pledging' conference and the November 1981 Blantyre one,³ the gross disbursement to individual SADCC countries from major donor sources during the 1980 - 82 period was substantial. Tables III(a) and III(b) show gross disbursements from major sources to the SADCC group as a whole and to individual SADCC members, respectively, over the 1980 - 82 period. Out of the gross total of \$5,435.10 million, the DAC of the OECD and the EEC together accounted for 78.17% of the total gross disbursement while multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the UNDP accounted for 17.88%

One observable phenomenon is that the volume and procedure of aid flow to the SADCC region from principal donors have been conditioned by several factors including the suppliers' political and economic attitudes towards Southern Africa in general and towards individual SADCC member countries. The case of the USA can illustrate this contention. As an ally of South Africa, the Reagan Administration is apparently worried over the politicization of SADCC especially given that it is not comfortable with the governments in Angola and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique (Brown, 1982, p.34).

A further examination of US assistance to the region also suggests a marked preference for bilateral arrangements rather than SADCC's multilateral approach to development. In 1982, for instance, out of a total of \$185.3 million US aid to Southern Africa, \$75 million, or about 40%, went to Zimbabwe. Hardly anything went to Angola and Mozambique (Brown, 1982, p.32). Moreover, following the March 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), the US pledged a total of \$225 million aid to that country over a three year period, or $4\frac{1}{2}$ times its pledge to the whole of SADCC four months earlier. It is, thus, not surprising to note that over the 1980-82 period (inclusive), the US government contributed only 9.79% of the gross DAC disbursements to SADCC members, as opposed to 15.2% from UK; 14.95% from West Germany; 13.50% from Sweden; and 10.09% from the Netherlands. West Germany's overall attitude towards SADCC is not any much different from that of the US. For example, in 1982, the West German "import and export values exceeded DM710 million and DM850 million, respectively. However, this represents only 23% and 14%, respectively, of Federal German trade with South Africa." (Zehender, 1983, p.41).

One observable feature of OECD aid to developing countries is that a substantial portion of it is tied to source. In fact, as data in Table IV show, aid to the SADCC region is more tied than the world average. For example, whereas 55% of DAC aid to the SADCC region is either partially or fully tied, the global average is only 47%. Donor variations in degree of procurement restrictions is also evident from the 1982 figures in Table IV, with only Nordic countries and West Germany registering a high percentage rate of aid flows without 'strings' attached. On the other hand, over 50% of disbursements from US, UK, France, Canada, Australia, Belgium and Austria have 'strings'.

In the overall, nevertheless, the total OECD contributions to SADCC (as an institution) by mid-1984 accounted for "73% of all the funds obtained by SADCC, albeit only 15.2% of the required total. Nonetheless, the six major OECD donors - US, Britain, France, Canada, West Germany and Japan - provided merely 4.4% of the funds needed by SADCC, which equals only 28.9% of all OECD contributions and 21.2% of the total received by SADCC. By way of contrast, the other members of the OECD (notably the Scandinavian and Benelux countries) provided 52.2% of the funds secured by SADCC" (Friedman, 1985, p.291).

The Nordic countries' interest in SADCC is phenomenal. As a result of joint Nordic/SADCC initiatives, a 'Joint Declaration on Expanded Economic and Cultural Co-operation between Nordic and SADCC Member States' was signed on 29 January 1986 in Harare, Zimbabwe, and provided for, inter alia, agreed procedures on development assistance (including co-ordination, management transfers and technical assistance); support for the productive sector (with regard to joint ventures and other investments); credit mechanisms, technology transfer; and cultural co-operation.

Multilateral organisations other than the OECD have demonstrated varying degrees of support for SADCC. The Commonwealth and the World Bank have continued to prepare ground and/or extend direct financial support for several SADCC projects. The World Bank's sister agency, the IMF, is not directly involved in SADCC projects although, at bilateral level, many individual SADCC countries have used its facilities with varying, often controversial, degrees of success. The IMF's insistence on 'free market' policies and the Fund's position that SADCC countries must get their imports from the cheapest source, including South Africa, not only has conflicted with the SADCC philosophy of planned and controlled development but also the Group's objective of isolating the apartheid regime. The IMF-World Bank emphasis on the need for the market mechanisms to be allowed to control production and investment has led to a bias in favour of private enterprise and against the public sector which is held to be equally, if not more, important by SADCC policy-makers. To confirm the World Bank bias in favour of private enterprise, "net investment by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank for private business venture in developing countries reached an all-time high of \$610 million in fiscal year 1985 (55% over what IFC loaned in 1984) while total lending declined in 1985 by over \$1 billion" (Thompson, 1986, p.6).

The EEC is supportive of SADCC objectives and its assistance comes mainly through the Lome Convention between the Ten European countries and 66 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states which dates back to Lome I in 1975. (EIU, 1985, p.44; OECD, 1985, p.5). Specifically for the SADCC region, the 'Memorandum of Understanding for the Programme of Regional Cooperation Funds under the Third Lome Convention for the ACP States of Southern Africa was signed in January 1986. It provides for 'joint programming of [SADCC]

regional resources with food security and transport and communication as the concentration sectors and manpower development as a support sector." (SADCC, 1986(a)).

Apart from the initial hostility expressed against the creation of SADCC by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa which felt that its creation was "the emergence of a north-inspired system of intra-subregional cooperation" and, hence, posed a "serious risk [of] weakening the larger and potentially more viable... arrangements by encouraging within these groupings zones of external influence" (Adedeji, 1982, p.29),⁴ there are other potentially conflictual areas between SADCC and the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States (PTA). For instance, SADCC's preference for a bilateral, rather than multilateral, trade strategy conflicts with Article 18 of the PTA Treaty which states that "in no case shall trade concessions granted to a third country under an agreement with a member state be more favourable than those under this treaty". In so far as Angola, Botswana and Mozambique are not members of PTA, what this provision means is that any present and/or future preferential trade arrangements between these countries and the rest of the SADCC members would conflict with the PTA Treaty - if such preferentials are better - unless the same concessions are extended to the rest of the PTA states. Already, the present preferential trade agreements between Tanzania and Mozambique and between Zimbabwe and Botswana, for example, are in conflict with the PTA Treaty and one can only wait and see how this is going to be resolved.

In the overall, despite several cases of hostility to the SADCC aims, substantial foreign financial resources have flowed and are expected to flow to the region in almost all its strategic production and infrastructural sectors. Table V gives the 1985/86 SADCC project financing status by sector and shows that close to 86% of the required project finance is expected to come from foreign sources.

4 SECTORAL ANALYSIS

SADCC policy-makers have set themselves tasks in the economic sphere which they hope to accomplish with the assistance of the international community. SADCC's three interdependent economic

objectives are stabilisation, rehabilitation, and recovery. Stabilisation, understood by SADCC to entail "halting the decline in output and maintenance and utilisation of productive, infrastructural and service capacity while achieving a sustainable external balance and acceptable rates of inflation and... borrowing" (SADCC, 1985(a), p.9), is seen as a precondition to the rehabilitation and expansion of SADCC's productive capacity.

To make meaningful analysis of SADCC's anticipated support from the international community, four strategic sectors are assessed below namely, transport and communication; food security; industry; and lastly, trade.

4.1 Transport and Communications

Since poor transport and communication in the SADCC region has been identified as the primary barrier to stabilisation, the development of this sector has received top priority since 1980 and the creation of the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) confirms this. Progress in this sector has been impressive over the years and by August 1986, a total of 20 capital investment projects costing \$193 million had already been completed (SADCC, 1986(a), p.21). The effects of South African destabilization of SADCC in terms of damage to property and productive capacity was estimated by the SADCC Secretariat to be \$1,610 million in the first five years of the Group's existence (SADCC, 1986(b), p.23). Damage to bridges, railway lines, locomotives and wagons necessitated traffic diversion to the South African transport routes and port facilities, thus, increasing the regional dependence on South Africa.

Progress in the Transport and Communications sector has, thus, taken place within SATCC which has concerned itself mainly with the development and rehabilitation of roads; railways; ports and water transport; civil aviation; and telecommunications. Meteorological and postal services have recently been added to the SATCC fields of regional cooperation activities.

In its January 1986 meeting with donors, SADCC's priorities in the transport sector were revised for the 1986 - 90 period amidst increasingly daunting transport problems vis-a-vis the

South African retaliatory threats to disrupt transport links as a result of increasing internal and external pressure for reforms in that country. During this period, priority is given to the completion of essential rehabilitation of the regional transport links and ports, especially Dar es Salaam, Nacala and Beira. The rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor, the most convenient route for most land-locked SADCC states, in terms of distance and cost, has received particular emphasis.

4.2 Food Security

All the SADCC countries' food production declined over the 1966 - 81 period (i.e. before the drought) and the situation was worsened by drought thereafter (SADCC, 1985(b), p.2). Whereas in 1981, SADCC's total grain production was 9.3 million tonnes, the 1982 figure was 8.2 million tonnes; only 7.3 million tonnes in 1983; and a further decline to about 7 million tonnes in 1984, representing an overall output decline of over 20% and about one third in per capita terms. SADCC estimated that over the 1982 - 84 period, the total cost of drought in terms of crop and livestock losses was about \$2 billion, with related costs including "reduced export earnings... and increased food import requirements with 2.0 million tonnes of grain imports in 1983/84" (SADCC, 1985(a), p.12).⁵

With the declining food production record and a rising food import bill, SADCC has embarked on a regional scheme which includes the development of an early warning system; food reserves; seed stocks; co-ordinated food policy; and the improvement in food marketing, storage, and processing.

4.3 Industry

The SADCC countries' industrial sectors are relatively under-developed with Zimbabwe being the most industrially developed country in the region, with the manufacturing sector contributing US \$1,195.3 million, or 30% of GDP in 1983. Table VI gives the manufacturing sector's contribution to SADCC countries' GDP. On average, recent trends in SADCC industrial growth have generally been downward and the principal

constraints have included the South African destabilization effects, especially in Angola and Mozambique where some of the industrial sectors' supportive infrastructure have been destroyed; the SADCC manufacturing industries' propensity to import inputs amidst foreign exchange scarcities; balance of payments problems; and smallness of markets.

Against the above background, the development of product standardization, consultancy services and appropriate technology is seen as a necessary prerequisite to the rehabilitation of existing enterprises and the creation of regionally-relevant industrial programmes (SADCC, 1986(b), pp.13-29).⁶

The need for rehabilitation of existing industries is very urgent for SADCC's success in this field. As UNIDO cautioned, "until existing industry is working more efficiently and nearer to capacity, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively upon plans for expanding the scope of the industrial sector (UNIDO, 1983, p.25).

Closely related to the need to develop a well co-ordinated technology acquisition policy within SADCC is the importance of devising a generally uniform policy towards the role of the private sector in regional development. There is presently a tendency among public authorities to underestimate - even ignore - the pivotal role of private enterprise (both local and foreign) when drawing up regional priorities, policies, and strategies and yet it is the private businessman in these countries who are more informed about investment, production, and market trends and opportunities. Consultations of the private business community, especially through their industrial associations and chambers of commerce should, thus, be an integral aspect of the regional planning process in SADCC. Indeed, it is mostly the private sector which is essentially the supplier of capital and technology.

Presently, SADCC countries' investment incentives; technology acquisition policies (where they exist); expropriation policies; mechanisms of settling disputes with investors; tax laws; and

general policies towards foreign investment vary significantly (Anglin, 1985, pp.85-89). Co-ordination of all these policies with a view to avoiding developments that make some countries in the region more attractive to investors than others would not only reduce the potential regional polarisation effects that are phenomenal in most development integration efforts in developing countries, but would also make the region's investment climate 'safer' from the investors' viewpoint. Studies that focus on the assessment of the region's investment policies with a view to harmonizing them into some form of a 'regional code of investment' for SADCC could be useful in this regard.

4.4 Trade

Lastly, a new realisation emerged in SADCC that sustained regional material production especially the required expansion in respect of consumer, intermediate and capital goods, does depend significantly on regional market expansion through trade measures.⁷ Closely following the recommendations of its commissioned intra-regional trade study (CMI/DERAP, 1986), the SADCC Council of Ministers recommended to the SADCC Heads of State to establish an intra-SADCC trade promotion programme. The SADCC Summit of Heads of State meeting in August 1986 approved the recommendations which had the following main elements:

- "a system of direct trade measures and bilateral trade agreements...;
- the exchange of trade preference...;
- supplementary financial mechanisms for intra-SADCC trade in order to ease the constraints arising from foreign exchange difficulties... Consideration is being given to the establishment of a Regional Export Credit Facility and National Export Refinancing Revolving Funds in those member states where they are needed;
- a trade promotion programme" (SADCC, 1986(a)).

To operationalise the above recommendations, the Summit created a new SADCC sector - the Programme of Action of Industry and Trade - under the overall coordination of Tanzania.

Intra-SADCC merchandise trade is presently very low, estimated at 4-5% of total SADCC trade. Table VII gives details of the direction of trade for the SADCC countries and clearly shows both the low intra-SADCC trade and the Group's considerable dependence on South Africa as both a source of imports and a market for exports. There are several barriers to intra-SADCC trade. The South African trade dominance is reinforced by Pretoria's trade agreements with Zimbabwe (Hawkins, 1985), the BLS states, and Malawi. Other barriers include the low level of processing in the region, making the countries to produce more or less the same unprocessed products; insufficient foreign exchange for financing inputs to produce exportable goods and for the provision of competitive export credit schemes; inadequate transport and related services; high cost structure which makes SADCC countries' exports to each other expensive and, thus, uncompetitive; inadequate knowledge of what is available in the regional market; tariff and non-tariff restrictions (the latter including import licences, exchange control regulations, and quantitative restrictions); and prohibitive donor policies especially in the areas of tied aid to import - and balance of payments - support schemes.

5. AREAS REQUIRING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

In the area of transport and communications analysed above, international support must include financial and technical support for the priority rehabilitation programmes; feasibility studies into the most effective ways of expanding the co-ordination and harmonisation of SADCC transport systems which should include national airlines schedules and routes; and standardization of locomotives acquisition. The manufacturing of wagons and spare parts locally; traffic forecasting; and the modernisation and upgrading of present surface and air transport facilities equally deserve international support.

In the food security area, external assistance is particularly needed in such areas as research into high yield and drought-resistant seed varieties; infrastructural support for better irrigation systems, food marketing, distribution and storage as well as research into appropriate agricultural policies and tenure systems that aim at

improving the traditional small scale producers' per capita output.

In the industrial sector, international support is required to help SADCC countries devise co-ordinated planning that would ensure industrial complementation. Identical codes in such areas as investment and technology policies; production location criteria; factor utilisation and industrial scale; ownership patterns; etc are important to avoid competition and overlap in production which could lead to wastage of the region's scarce financial and manpower resources. Foreign technical assistance would be needed in drafting such standardisation codes or agreements.

In the trade area, a policy of selective preferential tariffs, preferably at the bilateral level, is recommended as one of the intra-SADCC trade expansion strategies. The 'free market' comprehensive tariff removals region-wide, on the other hand, would lead to adverse polarisation effects. Due to its potential to promote maldistribution of rewards from industrial co-operation, a common external tariff must also be avoided in SADCC, at least for now.

The development of appropriate payments systems is central in trade matters and the international community could help in the identification of suitable schemes in this area. At the moment, SADCC should not divert efforts to setting up a clearing house for its payments requirements given the disappointing experience of the PTA whose facility has so far been underutilised due, mainly, to the nature and structure of trade and production in the region.⁸

The SADCC decision to look into the possibility of creating a regional export credit facility (to assist regional exporters offer competitive credit terms to their customers) in addition to the creation of more national export refinancing revolving funds (to make available to their respective exporters the required foreign currency for the importation of raw materials that are needed to produce goods for export) should be welcomed and fully supported by donor communities. Such schemes are important pre-requisites to expanded intra-SADCC trade given the region's earlier analysed financial constraints.

Lastly, given the scarcity of foreign exchange in the SADCC region, studies that look into the problems and prospects of barter/counter-trade deserve international support. Countertrade is quite common, estimated at 2% of total trade turnover among OECD countries and 5% of world trade (CMI/DERAP, 1986, p.11). Studies should include countertrade in both visibles and invisibles since such services as electricity and transport are important export earners for countries like Mozambique and Tanzania and, to a lesser extent, Zambia.

Problems which make countertrade unattractive to 'free market' advocates, e.g. the valuation problem; its inability to provide the foreign exchange required to pay off debts; and its negative effects on trade liberalisation as it stifles multilateral transactions - should not be allowed to deter SADCC initiative in this area. The Ruvuma Free Trade Area, established on 16 November 1981 between Tanzania and Mozambique possesses countertrade provisions and could, thus, be employed as a model for more similar arrangements within SADCC.

6. SUMMARY

This paper tried to demonstrate firstly the diversity in SADCC countries' resources endowment; development disparities, economic policies and strategies. The formation of SADCC, nevertheless, proved that such regional heterogeneity could not stand in the way of attaining co-ordinated development through regional cooperation. Mindful of their economic weaknesses perpetuated by, inter alia, severe drought, reduced export earnings, declining per capita output and mounting external debts, the nine SADCC states have increasingly looked up to the international community for the required technical and financial assistance.

The paper further tried to show variations in the volume and pattern of international support for SADCC and some explanations were sought. With increasing support for its programmes from such groups as the Nordic countries, the EEC and the OECD, SADCC has attained considerable levels of development in several productive and infrastructural sectors during the past six years of its existence. Through a critical analysis of SADCC's successes and shortcomings so far, the paper concluded by making several recommendations for further international assistance in such strategic areas as transport and communications; agriculture and food security; industry; and trade. The future success of SADCC's productive sectors, thus, appears to depend on the level of international backing the Southern African Group will receive.

TABLES ANNEX

TABLE I SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S PUBLIC LONG-TERM DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE

Country	Per Capita long-term public debt, end-1984 (U.S. \$)	Debt and debt service (U.S. \$ millions)			Share in debt service due in 1985-86 (%)			Memo items	
		Long-term public debt outstanding end-1984	Public debt service paid annual average 1982-84	Public debt service due annual average, 1985-87	Private sources	Official bilateral	Official multi-lateral	Use of IMF credit, end 1984 (U.S. \$ millions)	Number of multilateral reschedulings, 1975-85
Benin	148	581.5	25.7	87.4	74	11	15	—	—
Botswana	268	276.1	23.5	48.0	19	20	61	—	—
Burkina Faso	62	407.4	18.6	39.8	31	26	44	—	—
Burundi	73	334.4	10.2	29.9	22	36	42	—	—
Cameroon	176	1,737.8	231.5	281.4	41	30	29	—	—
Cape Verde	210	67.5	3.2	7.1	4	49	47	—	—
Central African Republic	89	224.4	11.6	21.3	17	57	26	23.9	3
Chad (b)	22	109.0	1.1	5.5	15	31	55	4.4	—
Comoros (b)	273	103.8	1.7	6.1	1	49	49	—	—
Congo	759	1,395.6	222.9	319.8	70	21	10	—	—
Djibouti	176	62.6	3.5	6.5	26	37	37	—	—
Equatorial Guinea	280	102.6	2.6	11.9	37	47	17	8.5	1
Ethiopia	33	1,384.2	68.8	126.3	35	48	18	74.6	—
Gabon	892	724.5	249.9	207.7	77	18	5	—	1
Gambia	226	161.0	8.2	16.9	41	23	36	27.0	—
Ghana	84	1,122.4	81.0	104.7	11	47	42	467.8	—
Guinea	196	1,168.2	83.5	138.5	19	66	16	11.3	—
Guinea Bissau	170	149.4	2.7	14.9	23	43	34	3.7	—
Côte d'Ivoire	490	4,834.6	797.1	1,020.3	70	12	18	591.2	3
Kenya	134	2,633.4	326.5	374.6	40	24	36	379.9	—
Lesotho	90	134.3	17.2	12.7	39	9	52	—	—
Liberia	357	756.7	35.7	109.5	42	26	32	208.1	6
Madagascar	168	1,636.4	94.0	253.5	41	50	9	148.0	6
Malawi	107	730.6	67.5	77.4	50	19	31	112.7	3
Mali	131	960.0	12.7	86.2	8	71	21	63.7	—
Mauritania	703	1,170.6	39.6	151.6	14	63	23	29.7	1
Mauritius	54	54.2	73.0	63.2	40	20	40	154.2	—
Niger	108	677.9	83.6	91.4	44	36	20	44.3	4
Nigeria	122	11,815.4	2,226.4	3,882.6	86	8	5	—	1
Rwanda	42	243.9	5.1	12.1	0	36	64	—	—
Senegal	243	1,555.1	65.3	227.9	33	47	20	200.8	6
Seychelles (c)	673	43.1	2.5	6.8	37	38	25	—	—
Sierra Leone	93	341.6	12.2	34.1	32	37	32	74.3	4
Somalia	236	1,233.0	23.6	132.0	6	47	47	101.6	1
Sudan	264	5,658.8	102.9	794.9	34	57	9	598.1	6
Swaziland	244	178.0	19.0	22.8	14	20	66	9.8	—
Tanzania	121	2,593.7	66.6	272.0	28	45	28	23.6	—
Togo	225	659.2	49.9	102.7	27	63	11	49.3	7
Uganda	47	675.2	77.6	106.7	29	47	25	315.0	2
Zaire	134	4,083.7	205.0	661.3	29	63	8	579.5	7
Zambia	429	2,778.7	137.2	433.9	38	41	21	697.9	3
Zimbabwe	177	1,445.8	286.5	331.1	80	10	9	256.2	—
Total	146	57,006.3	5,877.1	10,735.3	59	27	14	5,259.1	65

... Not available; — true zero.

Note: Excludes countries that do not report in standard format under the DRS.

(a) Agreements reached with private banks and official creditors are counted separately, even if they fall within the same year.

(b) Per capita GNP is for 1982.

(c) Per capita GNP is for 1983.

SOURCE: The Courier(No.97, May-June 1986)p.89.

TABLE II RANKING OF 17 LARGEST DAC DONORS OF AID, 1984

Volume of aid (In millions of US dollars)		Share (Percent)	Percent of GNP	
	Amount			
1. United States	8,698	30.4	1. Netherlands	1.02
2. Japan	4,319	15.1	2. Norway	0.99
3. France	3,790	13.2	3. Denmark	0.85
4. Germany	2,782	9.7	4. Sweden	0.80
5. Canada	1,625	5.7	5. France	0.77
6. United Kingdom	1,432	5.0	6. Belgium	0.56
7. Netherlands	1,268	4.4	7. Canada	0.50
8. Italy	1,105	3.9	8. Germany	0.45
9. Australia	773	2.7	8. Australia	0.45
10. Sweden	741	2.6	10. Finland	0.36
11. Norway	526	1.8	11. Japan	0.35
12. Denmark	449	1.6	12. United Kingdom	0.33
13. Belgium	434	1.5	13. Italy	0.32
14. Switzerland	286	1.0	14. Switzerland	0.30
15. Austria	181	0.6	15. Austria	0.28
16. Finland	178	0.6	16. New Zealand	0.27
17. New Zealand	59	0.2	17. United States	0.24
Total	28,647	100.0		

SOURCE: OECD Press Release(Press/S(85)44), June 18, 1985.

TABLE III(a) GROSS DISBURSEMENTS TO SADCC MEMBERS FROM MAJOR SOURCES: 1980-1982 INCLUSIVE

Country/Agency	Total in \$ million	Per cent of DAC	Per cent of Total
Australia	37.50	0.88	0.69
Austria	18.18	0.43	0.33
Belgium	24.70	0.58	0.45
Canada	200.40	4.72	3.69
Denmark	192.60	4.53	3.54
Finland	86.90	2.05	1.60
France	51.90	1.22	0.95
Germany	635.10	14.95	11.69
Italy	84.90	2.00	1.56
Japan	237.90	5.60	4.38
Netherlands	428.50	10.09	7.88
New Zealand	2.50	0.06	0.05
Norway	159.50	3.71	4.77
Sweden	573.50	13.50	10.55
Switzerland	37.30	0.88	0.69
United Kingdom	646.40	15.22	11.89
United States	416.00	9.79	7.65
DAC	3 933.70	92.59	72.38
EEC	314.70	7.41	5.79
DAC + EEC	4 248.40	100.00	78.17
AIDF	80.50		1.48
World Bank	343.10		6.31
UNDP	137.50		2.53
UNHCR	85.00		1.56
Other Multilateral	325.60		5.99
Total Multilateral	971.70		17.88
OPEC	215.00		3.96
TOTAL	5 435.10		100.00

TABLE III(b) GROSS DISBURSEMENTS TO INDIVIDUAL SADCC MEMBERS FROM MAIN AID SOURCES, 1980-1982 INCLUSIVE

Country/Agency	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Australia	0.20	0.70	0.70	0.30	0.80	0.30	22.50	5.20	6.80	37.50
Austria	0.40	-	0.40	-	3.70	-	9.20	3.70	0.70	18.10
Belgium	3.50	-	0.20	-	1.30	0.10	11.30	5.00	3.30	24.70
Canada	0.70	8.50	11.80	25.90	9.30	3.40	81.80	39.20	20.10	200.40
Denmark	13.60	9.30	4.50	10.90	25.90	1.10	104.80	10.50	12.00	192.60
Finland	0.50	0.10	0.20	0.40	11.10	-	48.50	23.30	2.80	86.90
France	2.10	1.30	0.40	4.90	8.50	0.30	22.40	2.30	9.70	51.90
Germany	3.90	54.10	39.90	64.80	7.20	7.60	322.50	82.60	52.50	635.10
Italy	4.80	-	-	0.20	38.80	0.10	27.50	4.80	8.70	84.90
Japan	-	2.40	0.30	27.20	12.90	2.40	128.90	58.90	9.90	237.90
Netherlands	15.80	10.30	9.60	12.00	66.10	3.30	219.20	61.90	30.30	428.50
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.90	0.10	0.50	2.50
Norway	1.30	29.00	0.50	-	39.10	0.10	136.20	33.00	20.30	259.50
Sweden	52.20	41.60	9.70	-	113.70	6.90	228.40	87.40	32.60	573.50
Switzerland	0.50	-	1.80	-	5.10	0.10	24.70	0.50	4.60	37.30
United Kingdom	0.30	50.40	26.90	83.20	25.10	29.80	171.70	105.40	153.60	646.40
United States	16.00	43.00	66.00	11.00	17.00	25.00	87.00	94.00	57.00	416.00
DAC countries	116.80	250.70	172.90	240.50	385.60	80.50	1 648.50	612.80	425.40	3 933.70
EEC	5.80	14.40	18.20	45.40	21.50	12.30	95.70	77.90	23.50	314.70
DAC including EEC	122.60	265.10	191.10	285.90	407.10	92.80	1 744.20	690.70	448.90	4 248.40
AIDF	-	3.20	17.90	23.10	11.80	3.20	18.90	2.40	-	80.50
World Bank	-	1.70	19.40	67.50	-	0.90	227.39	12.20	14.10	343.10
UNDP	14.90	7.50	11.40	21.00	22.30	4.80	36.80	12.50	6.30	137.50
UNHCR	-	2.20	3.90	-	5.10	5.20	19.30	8.70	40.60	85.00
Other Multilateral	36.60	22.20	34.60	23.30	40.80	13.70	66.00	38.70	49.70	325.60
Total Multilateral	51.50	36.80	87.20	134.90	80.00	27.80	368.30	74.50	110.70	971.70
OPEC	1.10	11.40	4.00	1.90	31.00	-	84.70	13.90	67.00	215.00
TOTAL	175.20	313.30	282.30	422.70	518.10	120.60	2 197.20	779.10	626.60	5 435.10

SOURCE(Tables a & b): OECD, Geographical distribution of financial flows to Developing Countries, Paris:OECD, 1984

**TABLE IV PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL GROSS BILATERAL DISBURSEMENTS
SUBJECTED TO PROCUREMENT RESTRICTIONS: 1982**

Country or Agency	Untied	Partially tied (1)	Tied
Australia	58	0	42
Austria	3	0	97
Belgium	23	0	77
Canada	17	0	83
Denmark	66	0	34
Finland	83	0	17
France	37	9	53
Germany	70	0	30
Italy	54	1	45
Japan	55	19	26
Netherlands	55	28	18
New Zealand	38	0	62
Norway	64	0	36
Sweden	83	0	17
Switzerland (2)	61	0	39
United Kingdom	22	2	76
United States	35	16	50
<u>Total DAC Countries</u>			
Global weighting (3)	53	6	41
SADCC weighting (4)	45	10	45
EEC	0	100	0
<u>Total including EEC</u>			
Global weighting (3)	49	13	38
SADCC weighting (4)	42	16	42

1. Procurement possible in certain other countries, usually developing countries and/or all members of a limited-membership donor group.
2. 1981 figures.
3. Weighted by total gross bilateral disbursements to all recipients, 1982.
4. Weighted by total gross bilateral disbursements to SADCC Members, 1980-1982.

SOURCE: OECD, Development co-operation efforts and policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1983 Review, Paris:OECD, 1983.

TABLE V SADCC PROJECT FINANCING STATUS BY SECTOR (US \$ MILLION) - 1985/86

SECTOR	TOTAL COST	OF WHICH		FOR WHICH		
	US MILLION	FOREIGN	LOCAL	FUNDING SECURED	FUNDING UNDER NEG.	FINANCING GAP
AGRICULTURE						
Agriculture Research	40.8	40.6	0.2	30.62	-	10.18
Fisheries	6.658	6.658	-	5.774	0.884	-
Food Security	299.416	265.96	33.456	93.729	23.45	182.237
Forestry	35.79	32.73	3.06	25.923	6.0	3.867
Livestock Production and Animal Disease Control	116.75	99.85	16.9	65.325	13.329	38.096
Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation	2.563	1.745	0.818	2.237	0.326	-
Wildlife	4.822	4.822	-	-	0.08	4.742
ENERGY	239.215	229.069	10.146	71.711	-	167.504
INDUSTRY	1619.252	1357.904	261.348	449.8508	29.622	1139.780
MANPOWER	34.187	34.029	0.158	6.909	19.083	8.195
MINING	2.04	2.04	-	1.4	0.54	0.10
TOURISM	0.145	0.145	-	0.145	-	-
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS	2962.11	2534.01	428.1	1083.05	255.5	1623.56
	5363.748	4609.562	754.186	1836.6738	348.814	3178.261
PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL COST		85.94	14.06	34.24	6.50	59.25

Notes: Funding Secured covers both the local funding component of projects and the resources for which funding agreements have been concluded.

Funding Under Negotiation refers to resources for which there is a clearly identified funding source and a high probability of concluding a funding agreement within a specified period.

SOURCE: SADCC, SADCC Annual Progress Report (Luanda, Angola, August 1986), p.11.

TABLE VI THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR TO SADCC ECONOMIES' GDP

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Angola MVA (mill kw)					
Share of MVA in GDP		3.99			
Botswana MVA (mill Pula)	49.3	71.2	81.7	91.6	108.5
Share of MVA in GDP	4.1	3.7	9.0	7.7	7.3
MVA (mill US\$)	63.5	85.5	90	93.5	94.5
Lesotho MVA (mill maloti)	11.9	14.7	17.9	21.1	
Share of MVA in GDP	4.5	4.6	5.1	5.5	
MVA (Mill US\$)	15.3	16.9	16.5	18.9	
Malawi MVA mill K)	89.0	92.0	91.8	98.1	101.5
(1978 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	11.7	12.8	12.4	12.8	12.3
MVA (mill US \$)	109.6	102.8	86.9	83.5	71.8
Mozambique (MVA mill Esc)	30.7	30.8	29.7	27.6	
Share of MVA in GDP *	37.3	37.8	34.9	35.2	
Swaziland MVA (mill E)	79.6	83.4	92.6	94 ^E	
(1980 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	21.8	22.3	22.8	23.5	
MVA (mill US\$)	102.3	101.6	89.3	84.5	
Tanzania MVA (mill T.Shs) 2288		1804	1482	1351	1171
(1976 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	9.4	7.5	6.1	5.5	4.7
MVA (mill US\$)	279.1	217.8	159.6	121.2	76.6
Zambia MVA (mill K)	162.9	180.0	173.0	184.5	
(1980 prices)					
Share of MVA in GDP	18.5	19.6	20.6	19.8	
MVA (mill US\$)	206.6	207.3	186.4	147.5	
Zimbabwe MVA (Mill Z\$)	857	1084	1188	1208	
Share of MVA in GDP	24.9	25.1	30.0	30.0	
MVA (mill US\$)	1333.6	1575	1568.7	1195.3	

SOURCE: SADCC, SADCC Macro-economic Survey, 1986, op.cit., p.104.

TABLE VII SADC COUNTRIES' DIRECTION OF TRADE (EXPORTS & IMPORTS)
(Percentage)

	Exports to:				Imports from:			
	SADCC 1981	SADCC 1983	S.A. 1981	S.A. 1983	SADCC 1981	SADCC 1983	S.A. 1981	S.A. 1983
Angola	0.0	0.1(1982)	-	-	1.2	0.9(1982)	-	-
Botswana*	9.1	8.2	16.6	8.3	6.3	7.4	87.5 ¹	81.4 ¹
Lesotho*	0.4	0.1(1982)	46.7	41.3(1982)	0.4	0.1(1982)	97.1	97.1(1982)
Malawi**	9.9	9.7(1982)	4.7	5.7(1982)	8.1	9.6(1982)	32.2	34.0(1982)
Mozambique	9.6	3.9	2.8	3.5	2.5	5.0	12.5	9.6
Swaziland	2.3	2.6(1982)	34.1	36.9(1982)	0.6	0.8(1982)	83.3	82.9(1982)
Tanzania	0.9	1.0	-	-	0.5	2.6	-	-
Zambia	4.0	3.5(1982)	0.6	0.3(1982)	5.8	6.3(1982)	15.1	14.5(1982)
Zimbabwe**	10.8	11.0	21.6	18.5	7.8	8.2	27.5	24.5

*Belongs to SACU (Southern African Customs Union) together with S.A.

** Have Preferential Trade Agreement with S.A.

¹ Percentages include goods imported from other countries transshipped through S.A.

SOURCE: SADCC, SADCC Macro-economic Survey 1986 (SADCC Secretariat, September 1985), p.43.

NOTES

1. Member countries were allocated as follows: Angola (Energy); Zimbabwe (Food Security); Botswana (Crop research and animal disease control); Mozambique (Transport and communications); Swaziland (Training and manpower development); Lesotho (Soil Conservation and land utilisation); Malawi (Fisheries and Wildlife); Zambia (Mining and looking into the possibility of creating a regional development fund).
2. For a useful presentation of different aid procedures in most OECD countries and international agencies, see Simba and Wells, 1984).
3. The 1980 pledging conference raised \$656.5 million as against the anticipated total expenditure of \$1 940 million tabled by SADCC. Donor pledges (in million US \$) were: Sweden (22); Netherlands (32); Norway (6); Finland (6); Denmark (10); USA (50); Italy (15); West Germany (2); Australia (1); Belgium (8.5); African Development Bank (384); EEC (100) and UNDP (20).
4. For the angry reaction from the SADCC Heads of State against such interpretation of SADCC, See SADCC, 1984, pp.30, 39.
5. For a useful analysis of some of the non-drought explanations and a review of the causes of food shortages in the SADCC region, see FAO, 1984.
6. For analysis of SADCC's short- and medium-term programmes, see Rossen, 1982 and SADCC, 1984.
7. Note, however, that SADCC sees co-ordinated production as the aim of co-operation and trade as a consequence, rather than a goal in itself.
8. Hard currency payments demands on settlement days in the PTA clearing arrangements have averaged 78% of the value of the transactions that pass through it, contrary to expectations. Hard currency is demanded mainly by those countries transacting in services and manufactured goods as they require convertible international currencies to continue production and provide the services.

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